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(I N RE E&A 11/2, Review by Squa­
drito of Watson's "Self-Consciousness 
and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals 
and Nature") 
SELF-CONSCIOUS RIGHTS 
The central issue in discussions of 
animal rights is the notion of "right". 
In "Self-Consciousness and the Rights 
of Non-human Animals and Nature" I 
consider two senses of "right". A 
full-bodied right is one that can be 
possessed, enjoyed, and exercised. 
In order to have a right in this 
sense, an entity must know that it 
has the right, and this requires that 
the entity be self-conscious. This is 
a reciprocal or "societal" right in that 
it implies at least minimal duties among 
self-conscious agents to respect each 
others' rights. Such rights and 
duties are cultural artifacts that arise 
in the context of social evolution. 
They are "natural" in the sense that 
societies could not exist without them, 
but they are artificial or artifactual 
because members of a society can 
decide among themselves about the 
content of these rights and their 
reciprocal duties. 
In contrast to societal rights that 
arise among self-conscious agents as 
they interact intentionally in a social 
context, there is a derivative sense of 
right that self-conscious agents assign 
to other entities that mayor may not 
be self-conscious. I call these "legal" 
rights, and their distinguishing fea­
tu re is that they do not necessa rily 
bind the entity that has them to 
reciprocal duties. This is because 
many entities that are assigned legal 
rights cannot act intentionally as 
agents; they cannot exercise rights, 
let alone fulfill duties. Legal rights 
do, however, bind self-conscious 
members of a society in a matrix of 
reciprocal rights and duties. For 
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example, if members of a rare species 
of blind shrimp are assigned a right 
to survival, they neither self-con­
sciously exercise the right lior have 
any duties to perform to maintain it. 
However, self-conscious members of 
society do have the duty not to 
destroy the shrimp, and the right to 
enjoy the survival of the species. 
The key point here again is that 
self-conscious knowledge as a basis of 
intentional action is required for an 
entity to have rights in the sense of 
possessing, enjoying, and exercising 
them as its own. The legal rights of 
entities that are not self-conscious 
agents are derived from rights in the 
full-bodied sense. Legal rights do 
not benefit or bind non-self-conscious 
entities that have them, but rather 
make those entities into pawns that 
play roles in societies of self-con­
scious agents whose intentional social 
actions are guided by a matrix of 
reciprocal rights and duties. 
***** 
Let me approach this in another 
way. The traditional reciprocity view 
is that an entity cannot have rights 
unless it can fulfill related duties, 
i.e., it must be a moral agent. I 
argue simply that one cannot fulfill 
duties unless one knows them, and 
thus self-consciousness is a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for hav­
ing rights. Peter Singer (Animal Lib­
eration, New York: Random House, 
1975) denies that an entity must be 
able to fulfill duties to have rights, 
but need only be capable of suffering. 
It seems to me that the relevant sense 
of suffering requires that an entity 
can know self-consciously that it is 
suffering. Self-consciousness is log­
ically prior to and necessary for the 
ability to suffer. Thus self-con­
sciousness is required for an entity to 
have rights, even if the criterion is 
taken to be the ability to suffer. 
Self-consciousness is in fact a 
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criterion of wider scope than the abil­
ity to suffer, for one can conceive of 
an entity that is self-conscious with­
out the ability to suffer, but not of 
an entity that can suffer without 
bei ng self-conscious. 
Could an entity have, benefit from, 
and exercise rights without knowi ng 
that it had them? Presumably it 
could. But such an entity must at 
least be capable of knowi ng that it 
has, benefits from, and exercises 
rights. This is because the concepts 
of 'having', 'benefitting from', and 
'exercising' here imply an entity that 
knows the relation of the thing to 
itself, and that can act intentionally 
with relation to it. It makes no sense 
to talk of entities having, benefitting 
from, and exercising rights and duties 
unless they can act intentionally in 
accordance with or against them. 
This rules out, e. g., a cat own­
ing a building, although if a building 
were willed to it, there is a legal 
sense in which the cat owns the build­
ing. But the cat does not know it 
owns the building, and has no duties 
to fulfill to maintain its ownership. 
And this is just the point. The cat 
has legal rights in this case, but does 
not know it has or benefits from 
them, and cannot knowingly exercise 
them. So far as the cat is concerned, 
the good things happening to it 
because of its legal rights might as 
well be accidental. Having rights 
makes a difference to entities that 
know they have them. To entities 
that can not know they have them, it 
makes no difference whether they 
have rights or not, for nothing (not 
even damage or destruction) makes 
any difference to entities that cannot 
know that they have things, i.e. to 
entities that are not self-conscious. 
In fact, the legal rights of the cat in 
this case primarily involve the full­
bodied societal rights of certain self­
conscious lawyers and guardians to 
benefit from the cat's legal right of 
ownership, and it binds other self­
conscious 
duties not 
ing, and so 
entities Ii ke 
to trespass 
on. 
you 
on 
and 
the 
me 
build­
to 
***** 
The main issue is that we wou Id 
like non-self-conscious animals and 
nature to have· some rights. This is 
in part because we will benefit from 
thei r preservation. Do they benefit 
from it? Suppose the universe con­
tained no self-conscious entities that 
could act knowingly and intentionally 
in accordance with or against rights 
and duties. What purpose would 
rights and duties serve in such a 
universe? Consider that in standard 
discussions of the ecological balance of 
a pond, e.g., the notions of rights 
and duties are not applicable in talk­
ing of how the balance is maintained 
as frogs eat some mosquitoes, fish eat 
some frogs, birds eat some fish, and 
so on. To whom are we addressing 
our talk of rights and duties when we 
dispute about whether or not nonhu­
ma 1 animals and nature have rights? 
We are addressing each other. We are 
trying to regulate the intentional 
activities of those self-conscious 
agents who might destroy some species 
of non-human animals and disrupt 
natu re. When we assign legal rights 
to non-self-conscious entities or 
nature, e.g. the right to be protected 
from unnecessary suffering, then 
full-bodied rights and duties pertain 
to self-conscious agents that do know 
they have rights and duties, and that 
can be persuaded to act in various 
ways. The concepts of necessary and 
unnecessary suffering here make 
sense only in a context of intentional 
actions, and thus do not apply to 
nature bereft of self-consciousness. 
There is nothing either. necessary or 
unnecessary in this societal or moral 
sense in a universe with no self-con­
scious entities. 
That is why self-consciousness is 
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basic in any discussion of the rights 
of animals and nature. Some nonhu­
man animals (even cats) appear to be 
self-conscious. But there is little or 
no evidence that Nature or the Uni­
verse itself is self-conscious or that 
there is any World Spirit or Guiding 
Force or God in Nature, and there are 
good a rguments that mere existence or 
life or non-self-conscious (behavioral) 
"suffering" does not give an entity a 
Natural Right to Be. An implication 
of this "naturalistic" bias is that most 
discussions of the rights of animals, 
e. g., of battery chickens, are really 
about human property. Garrett Har­
din is on the right track when he 
says "Ethics is the study of the ways 
to allocate scarce resources. (This 
definition serves equally well for. eco­
nomics and ecology -- which indicates 
the essential identity of these th ree 
disciplines.)" (Promethean Ethics, 
Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1980, p. 3). When we assign 
legal rights to non-self-conscious enti­
ties, what we are really nailing down 
are the societal rights and duties of 
self-conscious agents in a societal con­
text of intentional actions. We are 
determining whether or not the suffer­
ing we supposedly cause chickens is 
necessa ry or un necessa ry to ou r 
(self-conscious) interests. 
***** 
I do not think there are natural 
rights in the sense of rights pertain­
ing merely because an entity exists or 
possesses some natural characteristic, 
not even self-consciousness. But I do 
thin k a self-conscious entity might 
earn or generate or construct societal 
rights by fulfilling reciprocal duties, 
and that rights in this sense are the 
logically prior conceptual foundation of 
assigned legal rights that can pertain 
to non - recip rocati ng non -self-con­
scious entities. 
Suppose you are walking through a 
forest and a tree falls breaking your 
arm. You have no recourse against 
the tree because trees are not self­
conscious. They cannot do things 
intentionally, they a re not agents, 
and th us they cannot have natu ral 
rights and reciprocal duties in a soci­
etal context as defined above. If 
someone owns the forest and allows 
you to wal k th rough it, then you 
might be able to sue the owner for 
negligence. On the other hand, we 
can assign trees the legal right to fall 
naturally, e. g. by legally designating 
a forest as a wilderness area. Here, 
and also in a state of natu re where 
there is no self-conscious entity in a 
property-owning or custodial relation 
to the trees, you proceed at your own 
risk, and have no recompense. That 
is why the wilderness is a rather 
frightening place. There is no socie­
tal cushion of rights and duties out 
there. In the wilderness you are on 
your own. 
Richard A. Watson
 
University
Washington  
(for 1981/82: Advanced

Center for  
Sciences)
Study in the Behavioral  
(IN RE: E&A 11/3, Cave's review of 
Russow's "Why Do Species Matter?") 
To the Editor, Ethics & Animals 
Dear Sir: 
Not being a philosopher, am 
somewhat loath to take issue with 
George Cave's review of Russow's 
a rticle on the moral status of species. 
However, I feel that both Russow and 
Cave make a semantic error when tal k­
ing about. the "aesthetic value" of 
species. The fact that a householder 
may recoil in horror from a scuttling 
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cockroach or a housefly on the cheese 
does not mean that these creatu res 
are unaesthetic. They occupy special­
ized niches in the ecosystem and 
surely have some aesthetic value as 
parts of the ecosystem. 
The sugarcane farmers of Natal, 
South Africa, decided several decades 
ago that the black mamba (a poisonous 
snake) was a dangerous pest and 
decided to try to eliminate as many as 
possible. They were very successful, 
their success being announced by a 
veritable plague of cane rats which 
caused heavy damage to the sugar 
cane until the snake population built 
up again. 
The perspective that we have of an 
object greatly affects our appreciation 
of its aesthetic quality. A human face 
may appear very beautiful from ten 
feet but not when seen th rough a 
magnifying glass which shows the 
hairs and pores in all their detail. 
As David Hume remarked, "beauty in 
all things exists in the mind which 
contemplates them." (Essays, of 
Tragedy). A species should not be 
confined to a moral limbo on such 
flimsy and subjective grounds. We 
can su rely develop better criteria of 
each species' ecological aesthetics. 
You rs sincerely, 
Andrew N. Rowan, SSc., 
M.A., D. Phil., Associate 
Di rector, The Institute for 
the Study of Animal Prob­
lems 
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(IN RE: E&A 11/1, Johnson's 
review of Frey's Interests anq Ri£b_!~)
The Upshot of Scepticism over 
Some Criteria for Moral Standing 
~y book Interests and ~hts,
reviewed by Edward Johnson in Vol­
ume II, number 1, is an exercise in 
scepticism, on the su dace, about 
whether animals possess interests and 
righ~s. (and whether there are any 
specifically moral rights), but, at a 
deeper level, about the criteria for 
th.e possession of moral standing. I 
tried to be rath~r remorseless in 
tracking down and presenting a case 
aga.inst a number of suggested cri­
teria, such as the possession of inter­
ests, the capacity to feel pain, the 
possession of certain mental states or 
a certain sort of psychological 
make-up, the possession of desires or 
desires of a particular sort, and so 
on. I devoted most of my efforts to 
the interest-criterion, both because it 
is perhaps the most prominent cri­
terion used today to confer moral 
standing and becau~e the concept of 
an interest plays so important a role 
in moral philosophy (from utilitarian­
ism to rights-theory, where rights are 
not uncommonly regarded as devices 
for protecting interests). 
My aim was to shake people's con­
fidence in the criteria examined. It is 
in this connection that I saw my case 
against animal interests, my case for 
maintaining that a criterion of pain or 
the having of experiences or states of 
mind is both arbitrary and discrimina­
tory, my doubts about whether pain is 
an intr.insic evil, my case for saying 
that animals lack desires, beliefs, rea­
sons, and emotions, and so on, as 
relevant .. Nearly all this is negative, 
and that IS why the book is negative; 
so to speak, I saw myself as contrib­
uting something positive to present 
moral debates involving animals (and 
not just animals), i. e., compelling us 
to face afresh the question of the 
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criteria of moral standing, by means 
of something negative, i. e., shaking 
people's confidence in the prominent 
criteria examined, especially in the 
interest-criterion (and, partly through 
it, in the use of pain to confer inter­
ests and the use of interests to confer 
rights). Because the vast preponder­
ance of those who have been a party 
to and taken a public stand in these 
moral debates over the past five to 
ten years have been, so to speak, 
pro-animal, I spoke of an 'orthodoxy', 
against which my doubts about inter­
ests, rights, and some of the criteria 
used to concede animals moral stand­
ing collided. 
In his review, Johnson alleges that 
my position does not provide answers 
to 'moral questions about how, at least 
in general, animal welfare ought to be 
weighed against human welfare', and 
these questions are, if I understand 
the pu rport of his rema rks, the 
important ones. Perhaps they are the 
important ones; it is easy to see why 
someone might think so. But it is not 
true that my position nuver provides 
answers to them; it often does, but, 
admittedly, in the unusual sense of 
forcing us to see that we cannot 
weigh what is not there to be 
weighed. What I mean is this: the 
very way Johnson writes, of how ani­
mal welfare ought to be weighed 
against human welfare, obscures the 
upshot that my attack on criteria for 
conferring moral standing can or does 
have, namely, that unless this attack 
can be deflected, it is not clear that a 
particular theorist, in terms of his 
own theory, has anything to put on 
the animal side of the balance. For 
example, Joel Feinberg concedes ani­
mals moral standing because they have 
interests; if I am right, and animals 
lack interests, then animals lack moral 
standing, and Feinberg is left with 
nothing to weigh against human inter­
ests. Tom Regan's position on vege­
tarianism depends upon there being 
some moral rights and upon animals 
possessing one or more of them; if I 
am right, either about the existence 
of moral rights, a topic I explore fur­
ther in some forthcoming papers, or 
about animals possessing them, 
Regan's position is in trouble. He 
will simply be left with our preference 
for eating meat and no reason in 
terms of his own theory for thinking 
it is wrong to eat it. Peter Singer's 
position on animal liberation turns 
fundamentally upon the application of 
the principle of equal consideration of 
interests; if I am right, and animals 
lack interests (in the operative 
sense), then Singer has nothing on 
the animal side to be weighed against 
and to impede the pursuit of human 
interests. 
The point runs deeper. For exam­
ple, I try to show in my book why 
utilitarianism, whether of the pain/ex­
periences/mental state variety or the 
desire-satisfaction variety, has trouble 
over moral standing. A part of what 
I say in this regard about the former 
va riety has a Iready been mentioned 
above, so let me pass to the latter. 
There are great difficulties with 
desire-satisfaction utilitarianisms, some 
of which I go into, if the desires in 
question are actual ones; but what is 
clear beyond a doubt is that animals 
have moral standing in their own right 
in such theories only if they have 
desires. If I am right, and animals 
do not have desires, then such theo­
ries have nothing on the animal side 
to weigh against human desires and so 
nothing to take jnto account in terms 
of the maximization of desi re-satisfac­
tion. Most util ita rian desi re-theorists 
today, however, are tempted to move 
in the direction of formulating their 
theory around rationaldesi res. But 
now animals must have rational desires 
in order to have moral standing in 
thei r own right; if I am right, and 
they do not have rational desi res, 
then the same result as before 
ensues. In short, a theorist cannot 
weigh what he cannot get into his 
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theory in the first place, and if my 
attack on the criteria for moral stand­-
ing I examine succeeds, then we have 
strong grounds for thinking he cannot 
encompass animals within his theory. 
Now I do not deny that some of 
this on my side is rather startling; 
but that is not Johnson's point, nor is 
it in itself enough, I think, to show 
that I am wrong. 
R. G. Frey� 
Liverpool, �Un ivers ity of  
Toronto�University of  
